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FOREIGN SovEREIGN IMMUNITY AcT

Elliott v. British Tourist Authority, 986 F.Supp. 189 (S.D.N. Y.
1997); Although the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ( "FSIA ")
mandates that a wholly-owned, funded and directed tourism
promoting agency of a foreign government is to be presumed
immune from the jurisdiction of United States, the agency's hiring
of American citizens to work in the United States requires it to
abide by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( "ADEA ")
with regard to such employees and brings it within the FSIA 's
commercial exception, which may overcome such presumption of
immunity.

In Elliott v. British Tourist Authority, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that although the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act ("FSIA") 1 mandates that a wholly-owned, funded and directed tourism promoting agency of a foreign government is to be presumed immune from the jurisdiction of United States, the agency's
hiring of American citizens to work in the United States requires it to
abide by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 2 with
regard to such employees and brings it within the FSIA' s commercial
exception, which may overcome such presumption of immunity. 3
The plaintiff, a New York resident formerly employed by the British Tourist Authority ("BTA") in its New York office, claimed that he
was wrongfully terminated because of his age in violation of the
ADEA. 4 In response, the BTA moved to dismiss, arguing that as an
agency of a foreign state, it is entitled to immunity from jurisdiction of
United States courts, in accordance with the provisions of the FSIA. 5
In reaching its decision, the court employed a two step analysis.
First, it had to determine if the provisions of the ADEA applied to an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state that employs United States
citizens on United States soil. 6 If the ADEA applied, the court then had
to ascertain if the BTA was immune from the jurisdiction of American
courts under the FSIA. 7
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2898 (1976),
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d), 1602-1611.
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967),
codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
3. Elliott v. British Tourist Auth., 986 F.Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
4. Id. at 191.
5. Id. at 190.
6. Id. at 191.
7. Id.
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In determining whether the provisions of the ADEA apply to an
agency of a foreign state that employs United States citizens on United
States soil, the court first examined ADEA § 623(h)(2), which specifies
the ADEA's applicability to such circumstances. 8 It also looked to how
courts in other circuits have ruled on issues raised by § 623(h)(2) 9 , paying particular attention to the legislative purpose behind the 1984
amendments to the ADEA that added § 623(h)(2). 10 The court chose to
interpret the ADEA provision of non-applicability to foreign employers
as referring only to their employment of American citizens overseas,
and surmised that in adopting the ADEA, Congress never intended to
subject American citizens working in the United States to foreign employment law .11 Hence, by hiring United States citizens to work in its
New York office, the BTA subjected itself to the provisions of the
ADEA, to the extent permitted by the FSIA. 12
Next, the court considered the merit of the BTA's claim of immunity as an agency of a foreign state. The FSIA provides immunity for
"an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" if three conditions are
met: (i) it is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, (ii) it is an
organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (iii) it is not
a citizen of a state of the United States. 13 Plaintiff contended that under
28 U.S.C. §1332(c) 14 , the BTA failed to meet the third condition mentioned above, and was in fact a citizen of the State of New York subject
to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 15 Examining the facts, the court
concluded that "the BTA (i) was established by the British Government
Development of Tourism Act of 1969, (ii) is not incorporated in New
York and (iii) its principal place of business is London, England. Therefore, under the three-part test of § 1603(b), the BTA is an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state and is thereby presumed immune from
8. Id. The court concluded that the BTA is a "foreign person" under the ADEA. ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) (stating "the prohibitions of this section shall not apply when the employer is a
foreign person not controlled by an American employer").
9. Elliott, 986 F.Supp. at 191. See EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 888 F.Supp. 147, 148
(S.D.Fla. 1995) (stating that § 623(h)(2) was intended to apply only to overseas operations of a
"foreign person", not to the operations of a "foreign person" within the United States), Helm v.
South African Airways, No. 84 Civ. 5404 (MJL), 1987 WL 13195 (June 25, 1987) (concluding
that nothing in the ADEA indicates that section was meant to exclude United States citizens
working for a "foreign person" within the United States from ADEA coverage).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 192.
13. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), (b).
14. 28 U.S.C. §1332(c) states in part: "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business."
15. Elliott, 986 F.Supp. at 192.
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the jurisdiction of United States courts." 16 The court recognized, however, that the FSIA does not offer blanket immunity, and that it provides
for a number of exceptions.17
Plaintiff argued that the defendant's activities placed it within the
FSIA's "commercial ·exception," which overcomes the BTA's presumption of immunity and conferred upon American courts the necessary jurisdiction to hear the case. 18 The "commercial activity" exception
provides that sovereign immunity will not apply where "the action is
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state .... " 19 In order to determine if the BTA' s activities were
commercial in nature, the court "examine[d] the nature, rather than the
purpose, of the activity under scrutiny." 20 The court concluded that the
FSIA mandates that there be a clear distinction between a state's governmental activities (acts jure imperii) and its commercial endeavors (acts
jure gestionis), with only the latter offered immunity. 21 In order to determine which category the BTA's actions fit, the court delved into the
FSIA's legislative history 22 , and concluded that the hiring and firing of
American citizens (as opposed to diplomatic staff and civil servants) is
commercial in nature and not subject to immunity. 23 The court examined prior applications of the rule24 , and concluded that the BTA was
not entitled to sovereign immunity. Given that the plaintiffs title was
16. Id.
17. Id. at 193.
18. Id. Plaintiff argued that four exceptions to the FSIA apply to overcome the BTA's presumed immunity. As the court found that the defendant's activities are subject to the FSIA's
commercial exception, it did not address the plaintiffs other arguments.
19. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
20. Elliott, 986 F.Supp. at 193 (citing Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160
(7th Cir. 1987)).
21. Id. (citing Broadbent v. Organization of American States, 628 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir.
1980), Segni, 835 F.2d at 162).
22. Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, at 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604,6615 (stating that "public or governmental, but not commercial in nature would be the employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel, but not the employment of American
citizens or third country nationals by the foreign state in the United States .... Activities such as a
foreign government's employment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or
marketing agents. . . would be among those included within the definition [of commercial
activity].")).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 193-94. See Zveiter v. Brazilian Nat'l Superintendency of Merchant Marine, 833
F.Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), (foreign state was not immune from a sexual harassment claim
brought by a secretary who was a United States citizen employed by the defendant in the United
States. Court held that employment of the secretary was not "peculiarly sovereign in nature", and
therefore constituted commercial activity.), Segni, 835 F.2d at 165, (hiring of a marketing agent
for Spanish wines constitutes commercial activity), Holden v. Canadian Consulate, 92 F.3d 918,
922 (9th Cir.1996), (hiring and firing of "Commercial Officer" primarily engaged in promotion and
marketing constitutes commercial activity not subject to immunity.).
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"Manager of Industry Relations," and taking into account the nature of
the BTA's business, the court found that it fit squarely within the definition of a "marketing agent," which necessarily denotes a commercial
activity on the part of the employer. 25
Finally, the courts emphasized the need for "significant nexus between the commercial activity in this country upon which the exception
was based, and a plaintiffs cause of action." 26 In other words, the plaintiffs cause of action must stem from the same activity that gave rise to
the "commercial activity" exception from immunity. The court found a
clear significant nexus between the commercial activity of employment
and the plaintiff's claim of age discrimination. 27
In determining that the plaintiff's ADEA claim applies to the foreign state, and that the plaintiff's argument of "commercial exception"
under the FSIA successfully overcame the defendant's presumption of
immunity, the court held that it has the necessary jurisdiction to hear the
action. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. 28
B.

Rein. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya., 995 F.Supp.
325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); An amendment to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act ( "FSIA ") creating an exception to the sovereign
immunity rule for any state designated by the Executive Branch as a
sponsor of terrorism was constitutional, rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose, did not constitute an impermissible
ex post facto law, and did not violate due process.

In Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York held that an amendment to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA") 29 creating an exception
to the sovereign immunity rule for any state designated by the Executive
Branch as a sponsor of terrorism was constitutional, rationally related to
a legitimate government purpose, did not constitute an impermissible ex
post facto law, and did not violate due process. 30
The plaintiffs, survivors and representatives of victims who died in
the December 1988 crash of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scot25.
26.
1993)).
27.
28.
29.
codified
30.
1998).

Elliott, 986 F.Supp. at 194.
Id. (citing NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund v. Garuda Indonesia, 7 F.3d 35, 38 (2"ct Cir.

Id.
Id.
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94538, 90 Stat. 2898 (1976),
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d), 1602-1611.
Rein et al. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 995 F.Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y.
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land, originally brought an action against Libya on the ground that Libya
and its agents were responsible for the plane's destruction and the resulting loss of life. 31 On motion by Libya, the court dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. 32 After Congress
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
which amended the FSIA3 3, the plaintiffs commenced the present
action. 34
The defendant challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction by
questioning the constitutionality of the amended FSIA. It argued that
since Congress (the Legislative Branch) enacted a law of the United
States - i.e. the FSIA - which prescribed that the court's jurisdiction be
determined in accordance with designations made by the Secretary of
State (the Executive Branch), such law was unconstitutional. 35 In delegating to the Executive Branch the authority to decide which nations
may be accorded sovereign immunity by courts, Congress acted in a
constitutionally compliant manner. 36 The court pointed out that the
FSIA provides for courts to decline to hear cases against nations not
designated as terrorist states. 37 In other words, the defense of foreign
sovereign immunity can be used as a bar to United States jurisdiction in
the great majority of cases, but a United States court is allowed to establish jurisdiction when the nation concerned is designated by the Executive Branch as a sponsor of terrorism. 38 Yet, even in such cases, nothing
would prevent the defendant from using the defense of foreign sovereign
immunity to attempt to have the court relinquish its jurisdiction acquired
by conventional means. 39 In response to Libya's claim that it is entitled
31. Id. at 327-28.
32. See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 886 F.Supp. 306 (1995), affd,
101 F.3d 239 (2nd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1569, 137 L.Ed.2d 714 (1997).
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
34. Rein, 995 F.Supp. at 328.
35. Id. Libya is referring specifically to the FSIA provision lifting immunity from U.S. jurisdiction to states designated as sponsors of terrorism by the United States State Department (28
u.s.c. § 2371).
36. Id. at 329.
37. Id. Section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA mandating that "a foreign state shall not be immune
from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act
of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage [or] hostage taking ... except that the court shall
decline to hear a claim under this paragraph (A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
38. Id.
39. Rein, 995 F.Supp. at 328-29. See Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d
103, 106 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931, 87 S.Ct. 291, 17 L.Ed.2d 213 (1966), (stating that
"in an action against a sovereign just as in any other suit, jurisdiction must be acquired either by
service of process, or by defendant's appearance in court, or in rem by seizure and control of
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to certain rights under international law, 40 (presumably among them a
right of sovereign immunity) the court relied on Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., where the Supreme Court unequivocally
established that "the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country. . .. " 41 The court
reiterated that Congress has the authority to remove the defense of foreign sovereign immunity for particular violations of jus co gens, as it has
done in the 1996 amendment to the FSIA. 42
The court then examined Libya's claim that the FSIA violates due
process because Libya has already been designated as a state sponsoring
terrorism, thereby lessening the plaintiff's burden of fully proving every
element of the crime. 43 The court noted that the designation serves only
to establish an exception to foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA,
and in no way affects the liability of foreign states against whom actions
have been taken, nor does it diminish the plaintiffs' burden of proving
that Libya was responsible for the acts alleged.44 Therefore, the FSIA in
no way alters judicial due process. This holding is instrumental to the
court's rejection of Libya's next argument.
Libya's next position is that since the Executive Branch's designation of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism violated Libya's fundamental right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, such
designation should be subjected to strict scrutiny review by the court. 45
Since the court had already established that no "fundamental right is
implicated by this classification," it opined that the appropriate test was
whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 46 In this case, the court found that the protection of U.S. nationals

property. Only after such jurisdiction is acquired, does the sovereign immunity defense properly
come into consideration. Instead of being a 'jurisdictional' matter in the same sense as acquiring
jurisdiction over a person or property, sovereign immunity presents a ground for relinquishing the
jurisdiction previously acquired.").
40. Id. at 328.
41. Id. at 329, (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
443, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 819 (1989)).
42. Id. (citing Smith, 101 F.3d at 242).
43. Id. at 330.
44. Id. (citing First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611 , 620-21 , 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983).).
45. Rein, 995 F.Supp. at 330.
46. Id. at 330-31. See, e.g. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d
257 (1993).
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and air carriers qualified as a legitimate government purpose and, as
such, no further review is warranted. 47
The last relevant point addressed by the court was Libya's claim
that the 1996 FSIA amendment is an impermissible ex post facto law. In
rejecting this argument, the court stated that the ex post facto doctrine
applies when there is a possibility of arbitrary penal sanctions working
unfairly to deprive an individual of a liberty interest. 48 It is not applicable to the question of whether or not a state may be completely immune
from a civil action, and the decision by the United States not to grant it
sovereign immunity does not bring about criminal sanctions. 49 It did not
apply to the case at bar, where the only thing established by the 1996
FSIA amendment was "whether a foreign state is amendable to civil suit
in the courts of the United States." 50
Concluding that the FSIA poses no constitutional or jurisdictional
hurdles, the court consequently rejected the defendant's motion for
dismissal.
II.

A.

FoRuM NoN CoNVENIENs

Potomac Capital Investment Corp. v. Koninklijke Luchtvaapt
Maatschapplj N. V. D/B/A KLM, No. 97 Civ. 8141(AJP)(RLC), 1998
WL 92416, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 4, 1998): under the forum non
conveniens doctrine, discretion for a district court to decline
jurisdiction is broad and the dismissal should be based on
reasonable alternatives that would best serve the ends ofjustice and
be of the most convenience to the parties. The lack of discovery in
pretrial procedure, under a country's laws does not make that
country an inadequate forum.

In Potomac v. KLM, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a District Court has much discretion
to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens ("FNC") grounds where dismissal would best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of
justice, and the private and public interest factors strongly favor another
forum. 51 The plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant
47. Id. at 331 (court found that the 1996 amendment to the FSIA is a reasonable means of
achieving the legitimate government purpose of protecting United States nationals, and it is a
rational method of providing a forum for the victims to seek compensation for their injuries.).
48. Id. See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1272 (2°d Cir.1997), cert. denied,-U.S. -, 118
S.Ct. 1066, 140 L.Ed.2d 126 (1998).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Potomac Captial Investment Corp. v. Koninklijke Luchtvaapt Maatschapplj N.V. D/b/a
KLM, No. 97 Civ. 8141 (AJP)(RLC), 1998 WL 92416, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 4, 1998).
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for wrongfully repairing an aircraft engine, which failed in a plaintiff
owned Boeing 747 in route to Brazil. 52 The defendant moved to dismiss
the claim on FNC grounds and the court granted the motion because the
defendant satisfied the burden of showing that the private and public
interest factors strongly tilt in favor of having the case litigated in an
alternative forum.53
Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschaappij N. V. ("KLM") is a Dutch
corporation headquartered in the Netherlands and registered as a foreign
corporation in New York. 54 KLM owns an extensive aircraft and engine
repair facility in the Netherlands and was contracted to do repairs on
aircraft and engines operated by Atlas, a U.S. commercial cargo carrier,
which leases aircraft and engines from Potomac Capital Investment Corporation ("Potomac"). 55 An Atlas-Potomac Boeing 747, the engine having received repairs from KLM, was in flight from Dakar, Senegal to
Veracopas, Brazil when the engine failed. 56 The engine was transported
to Amsterdam where KLM examined it and determined that it was the
replacement blade, which had caused the failure. 57 Potomac filed the
negligence claim in New York but the defendant argued the Netherlands
is an adequate alternative forum and the claim should be dismissed
under the FNC doctrine. 58
The FNC standard is a two-step analysis which, if met, gives a
district court broad discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction where
"dismissal would best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends
of justice."59 The Second Circuit emphasized the importance and process of the two-step procedure. It explained that the court would first
ask if there is an alternative forum with jurisdiction to hear the case; and,
secondly, the court would determine which forum would be most convenient and would best serve the ends of justice. 60 The key for the court in
determining the second part is to weigh a variety of private and public
factors, including: ( 1) the ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the
availability of witness; (3) the cost of obtaining witnesses; (4) the efficiency and expense of a trial; (5) enforceability of judgments; (6) court
congestion; (7) imposing jury duty on forum citizens; (8) local interests;
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
290 (2d
60.

Id. at * 1.
Id. at *15.
Id. at * 1.

Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *l.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *4.

Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *4, quoting Murray v. British Board. Corp., 81 F.3d 287,
Cir. 1996).
Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *4.
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and (9) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in the application of foreign law. 61 These are known as the "Gilbert factors." 62
The court first looked to see if there was an altemati ve forum. Potomac did not claim that the Netherlands lacks jurisdiction and KLM
went uncontested in its declaration that jurisdiction would be proper in
the Netherlands' courts. 63 Dutch law also recognizes Potomac's tort
claim and the statute of limitations is five years; thus not likely to create
a statute of limitations issue. 64 The plaintiff argued that the forum is
inadequate due to a lack of U.S.-style discovery. 65 But even if the discovery is more limited, it does not determine whether a forum is adequate or not. 66 The Court explained that litigants in foreign tribunals can
seek discovery assistance under 28 U.S.C § 1782, which provides such
assistance to foreign tribunals and to litigants before those tribunals. 67
When weighing the Gilbert Factors, courts generally start with a
presumption in favor of the plaintiff as to choice of forum, especially if
the defendant resides in the forum. 68 The Private Interest factors favored the alternative forum in this case because Potomac is not a New
York resident; therefore, its choice of forum received less deference that
it would have if Potomac had been a resident of New York. 69 A foreign
plaintiff is to receive less deference if the plaintiff is not a resident of the
forum. 70 The Supreme Court has explained that because the main focus
of any FNC inquiry is to ensure a convenient trial, deference is usually
given to a plaintiff's choice, except where it is foreign to the forum and
convenience leans to another forum. 71 The favored forum is the Netherlands because the engine is being stored in the Netherlands, all pertinent
documents are available for review there, and 18 witnesses reside in the
Netherlands. 72 Potomac could not and did not show any such relation·ship to New York, except for the possible shipping of the engine (the
61. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-509, 67 S.Ct. 839, 843, 91 L.Ed. 1055
(1947).
62. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *4.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *5.
66. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *5. Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div., 807 F.Supp. 1117,
1124 (S.D.N.Y.1992), "the unavailability of beneficial litigation procedures similar to those available in the federal district courts does not render an alternative forum inadequate."
67. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *5.
68. Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1996).
69. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *7.
70. Murray, 81 F.3d 287, 290 (2d. Cir.1996).
71. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, at 255-56; 102 S.Ct. 252, at 265 (1981).
72. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *7.
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only form of evidence) to New York. 73 Common sense suggests that in
FNC cases the litigation take place in the forum where a larger number
of relevant witnesses are located. 74 The plaintiff tried to persuade the
Court that KLM' s involvement in prior litigation in New York was an
effective reason for them to pull the defendant into a New York court.
But, the Court reasoned that such a suggestion was as weak as one expressing they should sue in New York because one of the parties might
have a main office in New York. 75
KLM, the defendant, had the burden of showing that the Gilbert
Factors "tilt strongly in favor of' the alternative forum. 76 In addition to
the private factors favoring the Netherlands as an adequate alternative
forum, so do the public interest factors. The court determined the
Netherlands to be the most interested in this action because of the suit
being against one of its major corporations, while New York had no
interest whatsoever. 77 New York lacked interest, and even if there was
an interest it would not be sufficient to justify the large commitment of
judicial time and resources it would require if litigated in New York. 78
Court congestion and jury duty factors also favor the Netherlands as an
alternative forum.19
The court declared that the choice of law public interest factor favors the Netherlands. 80 It determined that Potomac misapplied a case to
its argument that United States maritime law is the applicable substantive law in the case. 81 The court corrected the plaintiff by stating that
just because the engine failed over international waters does not mean
that the tort necessarily has a maritime connection. 82 For there to be a
"maritime" tort, the wrong must have occurred on navigable waters or

73. Id. at *7-*8.
74. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *7. Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. M.V. EgascoStar,
899 F.Supp 164 (S.D.N.Y.1995), (holding that "when the greater number and more relevant witnesses are located in a foreign forum, common sense suggests that the litigation proceed in that
forum.").
75. Id. at 169.
76. Peregrine, 89 F.3d 41, quoting R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164,
167 (2d. Cir.1991).
77. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at * 10.
78. Piper, 454 U.S. 235, 261, 102 S.Ct 252, 268, 70 L.Ed2d 419 (1981).
79. Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at * 11.
80. Id. at *12.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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must "bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." 83
At this stage, the court decided it need not determine what law applies. 84
Finally, the Court concluded that in balancing the private and public interest factors, the Netherlands' courts are the favored forum. 85 Despite the fact that this claim was brought in New York, the case has no
relationship to New York. 86 Even after all of the non-New York, U.S.
based witnesses were considered, the factors still favor the Netherlands
forum. 87 KLM also met the burden of showing that the Netherlands is a
more appropriate place for the trial. 88 The defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens was granted. 89

B.

Capital Currency Exchange, N. V., v. National Westminster Bank
PLC, 1998 WL 634783 (2nd Cir. 1998); Antitrust suits brought
under the Sherman Act are subject to dismissal under the forum non
conveniens doctrine; if the forum is adequate and the Gilbert
Factors show more convenience in trying the case in the foreign
forum, then dismissal will generally be granted.

In Capital v. National, the Second Circuit held that suits brought
under the Sherman Act are subject to dismissal under the forum non
conveniens ("FNC") doctrine. 90 The Court also found that a district
court judge does not abuse his or her discretion by dismissing a complaint on the grounds that there is another, more convenient forum. The
Court affirmed the District Court's decision that the complaint be dismissed and that England is a more convenient forum. 91
National Westminster Bank PLC ("NatWest UK") and Barclays
Bank PLC ("Barclays UK") are English corporations that offer currency
exchange and money transfer services to their customers. 92 Capital Currency Exchange, N. V. ("CCE") is a financial company organized under
the laws of the Netherlands which has affiliates in New York and Britain.93 CCE was doing business with Barclays UK but was eventually
83.
(1972).
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
(2nd Cir.

Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. at 253, 268, 93 S.Ct. at 497, 504
Potomac, 1998 WL 92416, at *14.
Potomac, 1998 WL 92416 (S.D.N.Y.), at *15.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Potomac, 1998 WL 92416 (S.D.N.Y.), at *15.
Capital Currency Exchange, N.V. v. National Westminster Bank PLC, 1998 WL 634783
(N.Y.)).
91. Id. at *8.
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id.
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refused business. CCE then sought business with NatWest UK. Eventually, it too refused to extend banking services to CCE. 94
The plaintiffs brought suit against the two British corporations and
individuals involved with them in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 95 The plaintiffs alleged that it and its affiliates were wrongfully denied banking services. 96 The defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim under the FNC doctrine. 97
The plaintiffs argued that FNC cannot apply to antitrust suits. 98
The Court disagreed. 99 At common law, dismissal of suits had long
been permitted where, although jurisdiction and venue are proper, there
is another forum that is substantially more convenient; however, this
was not true of Federal Courts until 1947. 100 Even after there began to
be FNC dismissals in federal question cases, there were some not permitted under certain federal statutes, including the Sherman Act, until
1948. 101 The Court referred to the last overruling by the Supreme Court,
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §29, of a FNC case dismissal, brought under the
Sherman Act. 102 The Court held that FNC could not be used to transfer
an antitrust suit to a more convenient forum within the United States. 103
Shortly after the Supreme Court ruling, Congress passed 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), which provides that "for the convenience of the parties and
94. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.)), at *1.
95. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1&2.
96. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.)), at *1.
97. Id. at *1-*2.
98. Id. at *2.
99. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.)), at *2.
100. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed. 2d
419 (1981); Dismissals on ground of forum non conveniens and transfers between federal courts
are not equivalent, since statute allowing transfers was enacted to permit change of venue between
federal courts, and although it was drafted in accordance with doctrine of forum non conveniens, it
was intended to be a revision rather than codification of common law by giving district court more
discretion to transfer than they had to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens; and Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947); The doctrine of forum non
conveniens presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process and
furnishes criteria for a choice between them.
101. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.)), at *1-*2.
102. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 372-73, 47 S.Ct.
400, 71 L.Ed. 684 (1927); the court held that an action against foreign corporation for violation of
Anti-Trust Act may be brought in district where defendant sold goods in interstate commerce
through salesman, by service in another district where it resides, or is found transacting business.
103. See United States v. National City Lines Inc., 334 U.S. 573 (1948); The doctrine of
forum non conveniens is not a principle of universal applicability and whenever Congress has
vested courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine causes and has invested complaining litigants, with a right of choice among them which is inconsistent with exercise by those courts of
discretionary power to defeat the choice so made, the doctrine can have no effect.
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witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought." 104 The Court pointed out that Section 1404(a) has supplanted
the common law doctrine of FNC for transfers between U.S. district
courts. 105 The Court explained that where the more convenient forum is
not a U.S. district court, the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens govems.106
The Court moved to apply the two-step analysis of FNC to this case
by determining (1) whether there is an adequate forum; and (2) which
forum is favored by the public and private interests introduced by Gilbert.107 The plaintiffs argued that England is not an adequate alternative
forum because: ( 1) claims under the Sherman Act are not recognized;
(2) it might not award damages, and/or treble damages, in an antitrust
suit; and (3) plaintiff's common law causes of action might not be recognized. 108 The Court believed that under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome, which are similar to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and
which English courts are bound to enforce, the plaintiffs may litigate the
subject matter of their Sherman Act claims in England. 109
The Court challenged the claims made by the plaintiffs seeking recognition of money damages and common law claims. The Court pointed
to an interlocutory appeal where the Law Lords of the House of Lords
stated that damages are available for a violation of Article 86. 110
Although a final judgment was never entered in the case, and the decision was therefore considered dicta, the Court considered the case highly
persuasive on the question of whether monetary damages would be
available to plaintiffs in England. 111 As to the unavailability of treble
damages, the Court stated that his does not render a forum inadequate. 112
104. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2"d Cir. (N.Y.)), at *3.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *5.
108. Id. at *8.
109. Id.
110. See Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Mktg. Bd. [1984] 1 AC 130, where the court
recognized the possibility of damages under the Treat of Rome: "The 1958 Treaty of Rome, which
established European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), granted to that organization the
powers necessary to conduct and regulate trade in source and special fissionable material (e.g.
uranium and plutonium) among the member-states;" State Dept. No. 96-85 1996 WL 361511, *35
(Treaty); for a violation of a Wisconsin statute, "The Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act
(WEPA) requires that all state agencies carefully examine the environmental consequences of all
actions that constitute 'major actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.' Alternatives to environmentally significant actions must also be considered": 1995 WL
406030, *1 (Wis.P.S.C.).
111. Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2"d Cir. (N.Y.)), at *8.
112. Piper, 454 U.S. 235, at 247.
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The Court conceded that the plaintiffs might not be able to recover in
England on some of their common law claims, but this does not render
the forum inadequate and the essential subject matter of the dispute can
still be addressed.113
The Court agreed with the District Court in weighing the Gilbert
factors, that the public interests favor neither the New York nor England
forums but that the private interests strongly favor England. 114 If there
is an adequate alternative forum and the Gilbert factors favor that forum,
the case should be dismissed under FNC so that convenience may be
achieved and the ends of justice may be best served. 115 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing the complaint on the ground that England is a more convenient forum. The Court further ruled that suits brought under the Sherman Act are subject to dismissal under forum non conveniens
doctrine. 116
In conclusion, the court found that when a district court judge dismisses a claim brought under the Sherman Act, there is no abuse of
discretion if it is based on the existence of a more convenient forum. 117
The Gilbert Factors must be the method of measurement, favoring the
other forum. 118 In the transfer of civil actions to a more convenient forum, between U.S. district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governs, but
where the more convenient forum is not a U.S. district court, the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens governs. 119 England was
determined by the court to be the more convenient forum and, under the
forum non conveniens doctrine, the claim was dismissed. 120

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2"ct Cir. (N.Y.)), at *9.
Id. at *9-*10.
See Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, at 508; Peregrine Myanmar, 89 F.3d at 46.
Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2"ct Cir. (N.Y.)), at *11.
Id. at *8.
See Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, at 508; Peregrine Myanmar, 89 F.3d at 46.
Capital, 1998 WL 634783 (2"ct Cir. (N.Y.)), at *3.
Id. at *8.
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IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

Karim v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, No. 95 Civ. 510,
1998 WL 60949, at *l (N.Y.2d Cir. Feb. 13, 1998) (CSH); The
Second Circuit has jurisdiction to review an adjustment of status
decision when deportation proceedings have not commenced. The
District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's
exercise of discretion in an adjustment of status case must be based
on balanced reasoning and governing law.

In Karim v. INS, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York decided several issues: the Second Circuit does
have jurisdiction to review an adjustment of status decision when deportation proceedings have not commenced; the district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's exercise of discretion in an
adjustment of status case must be based on balanced reasoning; INA
§ 1182(a)(7)(A) does not exclude immigrants who qualify under Federal
Regulations 8 C.F.R. § 245.4; INA § 1182(a)(7)(B) applies only to
"nonimmigrants" as defined by § 1101 (a)(l5); INA § 1182(a)(6)(C) excludes only immigrants who intend to mislead U.S. officials. 121
On October 26, 1990, the Karim family entered the United States of
America. 122
They were refugees from Afghanistan who had been living in Paki123
stan.
The Karims used false Pakistani passports to board a plane destined for JFK Airport in New York. 124 Upon arrival, they immediately
informed an Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") officer of
their true identities as Afghan refugees. 125
In June of 1991, the Karims filed an application for political asylum
which was repeatedly adjoumed. 126 In June 1993, when the Foster
Nurses Agency filed an application for an immigrant petition on behalf
of Mrs. Karim, who had obtained a nurse's license, the Karim family
was allowed to apply for adjustment of status. 127 On December 18,
1996, the Karims were finally granted asylum, which allowed them to
stay in the United States, but they were denied the status of permanent
legal residents that they would achieve through adjustment. 128
121. Karim v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, No. 95 Civ. 510, 1998 WL 60949, at
*1 (N.Y.2d Cir. Feb. 13, 1998) (CSH).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at * 1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *2.
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The Karims filed their first amended complaint on September 5,
1995. 129 They argued that they could not be excluded for adjustment of
status under§ 1182(a)(6)(C) because they made no willful misrepresentation to a U.S. official; they could not be excluded under
§ 1182(a)(7)(B) because they never attempted to enter as nonimmigrants; and finally, they could not be excluded under § 1182(a)(7)(A)
because although they did not have the proper papers when they attempted to enter in 1990, this could no longer be held against them in an
adjustment of status proceeding. 130 The INS moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth two arguments. First, they argued that no statute specifically authorizes judicial review to adjustment of status decisions. 131
Adjustment of status is similar to a consulate's denial of a visa which
has long been immune from judicial review .132 Second, even if the court
did have jurisdiction, the district director did not abuse his discretion
and had solid statutory grounds to refuse to adjust the Karims' status. 133
Since the Second Circuit had never addressed the specific jurisdictional question raised by this case, the court looked to similar issues
decided in Howell v. INS and Jaa v. United States INS. 134 The court in
Howell held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the district director's denial of Howell's application for adjustment of status
once deportation proceedings commenced, because she failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies. 135 This exhaustion requirement arose as a
result of the administrative remedies available to Howell through deportation proceedings. 136 Howell had to pursue these remedies rather than
seek review in the district court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1329. 137 These
administrative remedies were not available to the Karims, however, because deportation proceedings had not commenced against them. 138
Also, as long as the Karims had asylum, deportation proceedings would
not be commenced against them. 139
Section 1329 was amended recently to grant jurisdiction in the district courts to some matters "arising under" the subchapter, not to all
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *2.
132. Id.
133. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *2. See also, Immigration and Nationality Act
§§ 1182(a)(7)(A), 1182(a)(7)(B), and 1182(a)(6)(C) (1998).
134. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *2. See Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d 288 (2d Cir.1995); Jaa v.
United States INS, 779 F.2d 569, 571 (91h Cir.1986).
135. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *3, citing Howell, 72 F.3d 288.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *3.
139. Id.
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actions brought by the U.S. that arose under its provisions. 140 Applying
§ 1329 as it read in 1995, Howell suggests that a denial of adjustment of
status should be subject to judicial review; the court, primarily concerned with the exhaustion doctrine, left that question open. 141 The INS
did not dispute that the Karims took every administrative step available
to them. 142 Accordingly, the court was satisfied that it could follow the
Ninth Circuit decision in Jaa v. United States INS. 143 There, it was held
that a district court "has jurisdiction to review a denial of status adjustment" where proper administrative steps had been followed. 144
The court then analyzed whether the district director abused his discretion in denying the Karims adjustment in status. The Second Circuit
set the standard for determining whether there was an abuse of discretion in Arango-Arandondo v. INS. 145 The court need only decide
whether or not the INS considered the appropriate factors and came to a
rational decision. 146 In the Karims' case, the court found all of the evidence was not properly weighed by the district director. 147 The district
director made no reference to any positive factors such as Mrs. Karim's
nursing job, the family's clean record, or their desperate circumstances.148 He focused solely on the Karims' means of entry into the
United States involving the forged passports. 149 This did not represent
the balanced reasoning that must support the exercise of discretion by an
officer of the United States. 150 The court held that while not every factor needed to be explicitly mentioned, the failure of the district director

140. Id. at *4.
141. Karim, 1998 WL 60949 at *4 (citing Howell, 72 F.3d 288).
142. Karim, 1998 WL 60949 at *4.
143. Id. at *3. See Jaa v. United States INS, 779 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.1986).
144. Karim, 1998 WL 60949 at *3 (citing Jaa, 779 F.2d 569, 571). See also Chan v. Reno,
113 R.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir.1997) (concluding district court had jurisdiction to review denial of
application for adjustment of status); Ijoma v. INS, 854 F.Supp. 612 (D.Neb.1993); Reid v. INS,
1993 WL 267278 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.7, 1993).
145. Karim, 1998 WL 60949 at *4. See Arango-Arandondo v. INS, 13 F.3d 610, 613 (2d
Cir.1994).
146. Karim, 1998 WL 60949 at *4 (citing Arango-Arandondo, 13 F.3d 610, 613) (concluding no abuse of discretion occurred where INS carefully and thoughtfully weighed the evidence in
Arango's favor. .. against the detrimental evidence; a court is not empowered to reweigh the
evidence where the evidence had been carefully considered).
147. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *5.
148. Id. at *4.
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id. See also Zaluski v. INS, 37 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.1994); Arango-Arandondo v. INS, 13
F.3d 610, 613 (2d cir.1994).
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to either mention a single positive factor or discuss any process of balancing or weighing indicated that he abused his discretion. 151
The court then interpreted the statutory arguments made by the parties. The district director first claimed that the Karims were excludable
under § 1182(a)(7)(A) because the Karims were not in possession of
valid entry documents. 152 Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations
relieves certain immigrants from the documentary obligation of
§ 1182(a)(7)(A). 153 The court explained that those applying for an adjustment of status are not seeking admission in the usual sense, but are
parolees, asylees, or others who have traveled a different route to residence in the United States so they would not be required to possess the
same documents. 154 Also, the court noted that the language of
§ 1182(a)(7)(A) differs from other provisions of that section in that it
speaks in the present tense alone, rather than present and past tenses,
referring to an immigrant "who is not in possession" of certain documents.155 Other exclusion provisions used the present and the past
tenses. 156 This change in language provides further evidence that a lack
of documents was not intended to permanently exclude an alien. 157
Thus, the court found that the documentation requirements that originally prevented the Karims from being admitted would not preclude adjustment of their status.15s
Secondly, the district director argued that the Karims were excludable under § 1182(a)(7)(B). 159 The court found this section inapplicable
because it only refers to "nonimmigrants.''160 The Karims did not qualify as such since each member of the family qualified as an immigrant as
151. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *5. See also Douglas v. INS, 28 F.3d 241, 244 (2d
Cir.1994).
152. Id. at *6. Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (1998) (stating that any immigrant "who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry
permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid entry document required by this chapter,
and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document ... is excludable.").
153. 8 C.F.R. § 245.4 (1998) (stating, "the documentary requirements for immigrants shall
not apply to an applicant under this part").
154. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *6.
155. Id. See *6 n.8 (1998).
156. Id. Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E) (1998) (referring to an
alien "who at any time" engaged in immigrant smuggling); § 1182 (a)(6)(C) (1998) (referring to
an alien who "seeks to procure (or has sought or procured)" documents by fraud); § 1182
(a)(l)(D) (1998) (referring to an alien who "is or has been" a member of a totalitarian party).
157. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *6.
158. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *6.
159. Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II) (1998) (stating that
any nonimmigrant who "is not in possession of a valid nonimmigrant visa or border crossing
identification card at the time of application for admission is excludable.").
160. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *6.
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defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5) which included every alien except
those within certain specific exceptions. 161 The INS abandoned this argument in their briefs before the court. 162
Finally, the district director denied the Karims' adjustment of status
claiming that they were excludable under § 1182 (a)(6)(C). 163 In the
words of the director, the Karims "presented fraudulent documents in an
attempt to gain entry into the United States." 164 However, the court relied on Matter of D.L & A.M. where the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA") held that an alien is excludable under § 1182(a)(6)(A) only if
there is evidence that the alien intended to present fraudulent documents
to an authorized official of the United States Government. 165 Similarly,
in Matter of Y. G., the BIA determined that even though the alien had
used a false passport to arrive in the United States, because he "gave his
real name, stated that the documents he possessed were not his own" and
was otherwise forthright with the officials, no misrepresentation had occurred.166 Likewise, the Karims did not use their fraudulent passports to
gain admission to the United States. Rather, they revealed their true
identities to the United States Official immediately upon their arrival in
New York. 167
In Garcia v. INS, the court held that exclusion under the misrepresentation provision requires "subjective intent" on the part of the alien,
involving willful, deliberate behavior." 168 Although the Karims possessed fraudulent passports, the family's immediate renunciation of the
passports at JFK airport was evidence of their honest intentions. 169
Thus, the court held that there was no attempt by the Karims to misrepresent themselves to a United States official. 170
The district director denied the Karim family an adjustment of status. He believed the decision was within his discretion and not within
the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit. However, the court held that the
case was within their jurisdiction and that the district director did not
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6(C)(i) (1998) (stating, "Any alien
who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure a visa, other documentation, or entry into the United States or other benefit provided under this chapter is excludable.").
164. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *6.
165. Id. at *7. See Matter of D.L. & A.M., Int. Dec.# 3162 (BIA Oct. 16, 1991).
166. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *7. See Matter of Y.G., Int. Dec. # 3219 (BIA May 5,
1994).
167. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *7.
168. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *7. See Garcia v. INS, 31 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir.1994)
(citing Suite v. INS, 594 F.2d 972, 973 (3d Cir.1979).).
169. Karim, 1998 WL 60949, at *7.
170. Id.
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base his decision on balanced reasoning and governing law. As a result,
the court found that the Karims were entitled to an adjustment of status.
IV.

QuAsI-IN-REM JURISDICTION AND THE QUESTION OF DuE
PRocEss FoR FOREIGN ENTITIES.

A.

Orient Overseas Container Line v. Kids International Corp., No. 96
Civ. 4699 (DLC), 1998 WL 531840 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 24, 1998); Under
the due process standards of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
third-party defendants, China Export and Shanghai North, lacked
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum as to permit the
exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and allow a motion for
attachment by third-party plaintiff Kids International Corp.

In Orient Overseas Container Line v. Kids International Corp. the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that under the Constitutional due process requirements presented in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, third-party defendants, Frame International Ltd., China Export Bases Development Shanghai Corp. ("China
Export") and Shanghai North Rex-Pu Industries Corp. ("Shanghai
North"), lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to permit
the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction which resulted in the denial of a
motion for attachment by third-party plaintiff Kids International Corp.,
("Kids"). 171 In April 1995, China Export and Shanghai North were
awarded a judgment against Orient Overseas Container Lines ("Orient")
blaming Orient for the improper release of goods without original bills
of lading. 172 June 24, 1996, Orient commenced the present action seeking to force Kids to honor the parties' indemnity letters justifying the
release of these goods. 173 Kids then sought attachment of the money
judgment awarded in 1995 to China Export and Shanghai North. 174 Orient now opposes Kids motion stating that China Export and Shanghai
North have insufficient contacts with the New York forum to establish
personal jurisdiction and allow for attachment. 175
In 1994, Kids, a New York clothing corporation, contracted to
purchase apparel in the amount of $970 million from third-party defendant, Frame International, who was a joint venturer with third-party de171.
1998 WL
172.
173.
174.
175.

Orient Overseas Container Line v. Kids International Corp., No. 96 CIV. 4699 (DLC),
531840, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 24, 1998).
Id. at *l.
Id.
Id. at *l.
Id.
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fondant, Yangzhou Elizabeth Garments Co., Ltd. ("Elizabeth"). 176
Elizabeth subcontracted a portion of the manufacturing work to China
Export. 177 When Elizabeth and China Export did not acquire necessary
export quotas to effect shipment of the goods to Kids, Shanghai North
became involved and was named the shipper on the remaining two
bills. 178 Plaintiff Orient, a Hong Kong corporation, was selected to
transport the clothing from China to the United States. 179
Orient transported the goods to New York and upon arrival notified
Kids that in order to release the goods under the shipment terms Kids
needed to present Orient with original bills of lading. 180 Kids, unable to
locate the original bills of lading, would only receive the clothing upon
agreement to sign letters of indemnity holding Orient harmless to claims
brought against Orient as a result of its release of the goods without the
original bills of lading. 181 Kids never made payments on the clothing to
any third party defendants, claiming the garments were defective. 182
In April 1995, to secure payment goods, China Export and Shanghai North commenced an action in Shanghai Maritime Court against
Orient for the improper release of goods without obtaining the bills of
lading.183 In 1996, Orient initiated the present action seeking an order
requiring Kids to honor the parties' indemnity letters by way of intervention and injunction. 1s4
Kids filed a Third Party Complaint demanding damages from thirdparty defendants and a Notice of Motion for an order of Attachment of
the 1995 Shanghai Judgement pursuant to Supplemental Rule B( 1) Fed.
R. Civ. P. or 4(n)(2) Fed. R. Civ. P.1ss
The issue presented to the Southern District of New York was
whether Kids may attach the Shanghai Judgement awarded against the
Orient and establish quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in this Court over China
Export and Shanghai North. 186 The court, in considering an attachment
to attain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, focused on two factors: (1) Whether
the movant has satisfied the conditions for an order of attachment under
the procedural rules; and, (2) whether the court's exercise of jurisdiction
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Orient, 1998 WL 5 31840, at * 1.
Id.
Id. at *2
Id.
Id.
Id.
Orient, 1998 WL 531840, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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over the defendants, if attachment occurs, satisfies Constitutional standards of due process. The court found Kid's arguments failed the latter
aspect of this test.187
Kids first argued that it may obtain a motion for attachment under
Supplement Rule B(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Admiralty) which was easily rejected by the court. 188 The court concluded
Kids could not apply Rule B(l) because they filed no claim in admiralty
against China Export and Shanghai North which is required for an attachment under the rule.189
In determining the acceptance of attachment under Rule 4(n)(2)
Fed. R. Civ. P., the court reasoned that Kids did satisfy all of the circumstances under Article 62 of the C.P.L.R. 190 Thus, Kids was entitled to an
order of attachment against China Export and Shanghai North. The sole
question that remained for the court was whether the use of the attachment, a procedure to establish jurisdiction over these entities, was consistent with prevailing Constitutional standards.
The standard needed to exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and fulfill
Constitutional due process requirements is established in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington. 191 The Southern District Court considered
whether minimum contacts existed as to be "fair and just" in forcing
foreign corporations to defend an action in New York initiated by attachment. 192 It was decided Kids did not satisfy the burden of the minimum contacts test as set forth in International Shoe. 193
187. Intermeat v. American Poultry, 575 F.2d 1017, 1020 (2d.cir.1978) (holding: Minimum
contacts were satisfied when a non-resident defendant had "continuous involvement in the commerce of New York, had repeatedly consented to arbitration in New York, and purchased meat
through New York importers.").
188. FED.R.CIV.P.SUPP.RULE B (1), ("The rule envisions that the [attachment]order will
issue when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that he has a maritime claim against the
defendant in the amount used for and the defendant is not present in the district.").
189. Orient, 1998 WL 531840, at *3.
190. Id. at *3 - *4, (The relevant provision of New York law to which the Rule points is
found in Article 62 of the C.P.L.R., §6201, "[A]n order of attachment may be granted" when the
defendant "is a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the state.").
191. Id. at *5. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (holding:
"Due process requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with [the forum], such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and justice.") and
Orient Overseas Container Line v. Kids International Corp., No. 96 Civ. 4699 (DLC), 1998 WL
531840 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 24,1998).
192. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154. See, APC Commodity
Corp. v. Ram Dis Ticaret A.S., 965 F.Supp. 461, 465 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (holding: "The test is
whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to make it fair and just that the foreign corporation
be required to come to New York to defend the action that was begun by attachment.").
193. Id.
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General jurisdiction could not be established due to lack of systematic contacts. It was stipulated that China Export and Shanghai North
had no offices, employees, or bank accounts in New York nor did they
solicit, transact, or have a license for business in New York. 194 Thus,
the court reasoned that there was no systematic contacts and no jurisdictional presence in the district. 195 China Exports and Shanghai North had
no direct contacts with New York to show continuous involvement in
the commerce of New York.196
The court further considered that the only way China Export and
Shanghai North could have minimum contacts with New York was by
the contract they both had with Elizabeth and Frame. 197 Minimum contacts with the forum did not exist by virtue of their contacts with these
entities that had minimum contacts. 198 Kids argued that minimum contacts was satisfied because China Export and Shanghai North knew the
garments were destined for New York and intended to gain financially
from the transaction in the forum. 199 This argument was rejected by the
court.
Ultimately, the court held that Kids failed to fulfill the due process
requirement to enable quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the third-party defendants due to a lack of evidence of purposeful acts which would establish minimum contacts in New York. 200 The result eliminated a
possibility of the appearance of China Export and Shanghai North before
the New York forum.201

v.
A.

WARSAW CONVENTION

Shah v. Pan American World Services, Inc., 148 F.3d 84 (2nd
Cir.(NY) June 15, 1998); A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation
may be considered willful misconduct under the Warsaw
Convention; the liability causation standard established by the
Warsaw Convention is whether the damages would have occurred
had the carrier performed as promised.

In Shah v. Pan American World Services, Inc. the Second Circuit
held that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation may be considered
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Orient, 1998 WL 531840, at *7.
Id.

Intermeat, 575 F.2d at 1018.
Id. at*6.

Orient, 1998 WL 531840, at *7.

Id.
Id.
201. Id.
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willful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention ("Convention") 202 , removing carrier liability limitations if found. 203 The Second Circuit also
held that the causation standard established by the Convention is
whether the damages would have occurred had the carrier performed as
promised. 204
Injured passengers and relatives of those killed during the hijacking
of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan on September 5, 1986 filed
suit in several United States district courts against Pan Am for damages.205 In 1987 and 1988 the lawsuits were transferred to the Southern
District of New York by the multi-district litigation panel for consolidated pre-trial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The court referred
the consolidated case to itself in December, 1993. 206
At trial the plaintiffs argued that Pan Am had engaged in willful
misconduct by advertising it had contracted a security system for its
international flights with Alert Management Systems, Inc.("Alert"). 207
In April, 1994, the jury returned a special verdict determining that Pan
Am did engage in willful misconduct in connection with Alert but the
misconduct was not the proximate cause of the hijacking. 208 The district
court entered a final judgement for damages within the limitations of the
Convention. 209 On appeal, the Second Circuit determined that fraudulent misrepresentation can be considered willful misconduct in actions
brought pursuant to the Convention. 210
Article 17 of the Convention establishes liability for the death or
wounding of passengers on board aircraft, subject to limitations established in Article 22. 211 However, Article 25 removes limitations for
damages caused by willful misconduct, 212 which the court defined as
actions taken with the knowledge injury or death would probably result
202. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air ("Warsaw Convention") concluded Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876
(1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105 (1997).
203. Shah. v Pan Am. World Serv., Inc., 148 F.3d 84, 92 (2nd Cir.(NY) June 15, 1998).
204. Id. at 95.
205. Id. at 88.
206. Id.
207. Id. (Only one set of the plaintiffs, the Singhs, allegedly relied on these representations
in choosing Pan Am. Sadanand Singh brought suit individually and as executor of the estates of
Kala, Samir, and Kalpana Singh. There were several additional plaintiffs to the appeal).
208. Shah, 148 F.3d at 88-89.
209. Id. at 89, 93.
210. Id. at 93.
211. Shah, 148 F.3d. at 92 citing Warsaw Convention supra note 1, at arts. 17, 22. (Liability
limitations under Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention were modified by the Montreal Agreement, approved by the U.S. See Exec Order No. 23,680, 31 Fed.Reg. 7,302 (1966)).
212. Shah, 148 F.3d at 93 citing Warsaw Convention supra note 1, at art. 25(1).
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or a "conscious or reckless disregard of . . . the consequence of its actions. "213 The court found the Convention did not require equal treatment for all passengers when only some were injured by a carrier's
misconduct. 214
The court then looked to the Convention to establish the proper
causation standard for willful misconduct claims. Article 24 restricts
damage actions under Article 17 to the conditions and limits of the convention itself. 215 Because there are no provisions suggesting causation
to be determined otherwise, and as the Convention was intended to create a uniform standard, 216 the court held it is the law of the Convention
itself which applies to the causation question and no other jurisdictional
standard. 217
The court examined three possible interpretations of the Convention language before establishing the proper standard. First, it rejected
but-for causation as overly broad and insufficient. 218 This approach
would allow a passenger lured on board by a misrepresentation of comfort and luxury then injured in a hijacking to file a claim because the
false advertising caused them to board and suffer injury. 219
The Singh plaintiffs urged a second interpretation, linking both reliance on misrepresentation and the relationship between injuries and the
misrepresentation. 220 The court found that if the representations made
had been carried out and injuries still would have occurred, the misrepresentations could not be said to have caused the injures. 221 Holding
carriers liable for actions that would have occurred regardless of whether
the representations were performed as advertised would be counter to
one of the primary purposes of the Convention, limiting carrier
liability. 222
It was the third interpretation which the court adopted. To establish
causation for willful misconduct under Article 25, plaintiffs must
demonstrate a reasonable reliance on fraudulent misrepresentation as an
213. Shah, 148 F.3d at 93 citing Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air
Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804, 812 (2nd Cir.(NY), September
12, 1994)("Lockerbie II").
214. Id.
215. Shah, 148 F.3d at 93 citing Warsaw Convention supra note 1, at art. 24.
216. Shah, 148 F.3d at 94 citing Rein v. Pan American World Airways Inc. (In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988), 928 F.2d 1267, 1270, 1280 (2nd Cir.(NY), March
22, 1991 )("Lockerbie I").
217. Shah, 148 F.3d at 95.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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inducement to use the carrier and then show "the damages would not
have occurred if the carrier had performed as promised." 223 Under this
definition, the Article 22 liability cap is not removed in the instant case
assuming that even if the Alert program delivered as promised, it would
not have prevented the hijacking.224
Having determined the proper standard to apply, the Second Circuit
then looked to see if this was the same one used in the jury instructions
and special verdict. 225 The court found that while the form of the special
verdict question on misconduct as a proximate cause of the hijacking
could have been better worded, the district court's instructions clarified
the question of causation with language consistent with the Convention
definition and, therefore, the special verdict was not subject to reversal. 226 Given the definition established by the Convention and the lack
of reversible error in the special verdict handed down at trial, the court
coneluded there were no grounds for a misrepresentation claim. 227
The Singh plaintiffs also challenged the English translation of the
Convention. They argued it establishes a different misconduct-causation
relationship than the original French text does. 228 They believed a closer
translation to the original text requires the damage need only 'arise out
of,' not be 'caused by,' the incident. They further argued that under this
seemingly lower threshold, the special verdict is not a bar to a fraudulent
misrepresentation claim. 229 The court found that under actions arising
from willful misconduct, the arising out of approach might be permissible. "230 But the court found it inappropriate to rule on this issue because
the plaintiffs did not object to the jury instructions or the special verdict
questions before the verdict was reached. 231
In accordance with established law, the court found that all of the
state law claims the Singh plaintiffs sought were within the scope of the
Warsaw Convention and state law claims which fall within the scope of
the Convention are preempted. 232
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
Cir.(NY),

Shah, 148 F.3d at 95.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 96
Id. at 96-97.
Shah, 148 F.3d at 97.
Id.
Id.
Shah, 148 F.3d at 97, 98 citing Fishman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 141 (2nd
Jan. 05, 1998)(citing Lockerbie I, 928 F.2nd at 1273).
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The court also rejected appeals related to the case's referral under
§ 1407.233

u.s.c.

233. Id. at 90 (The Supreme Court had recently ruled against self-referral of §1407 cases. see
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,-U.S. --, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d
62 (1998). The court held that this ruling did not apply retroactively).
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